

# Matching Problems

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Problems introduced in 1962 by Gale and Shapley for the study of two sided markets:

- 1) workers & employers;
- 2) interns & hospitals;
- 3) students & universities;
- 4) women & men;
- 5) ...

**Basic question:** what is the **best** definition of **stable placements**?

## WOMEN & MEN

Two groups  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ .

Each element of  $\mathcal{A}$  ( $\mathcal{B}$ ) has a ranking on the elements of  $\mathcal{B}$  ( $\mathcal{A}$ ).

Searching for **pairs**

One to one matching

Further initial assumptions

- 1) The two groups have the **same** number of elements;
- 2) All elements rank **all** elements of the other group.

## Definition

Let  $X$  be a set. A *(strict) preference relation* on  $X$  is a binary relation  $\succ$  fulfilling, for all  $x, y, z \in X$ :

- 1) if  $x \neq y$  either  $x \succ y$  or  $y \succ x$  (*completeness*);
- 2)  $x \not\succeq x$  (*irreflexivity*);
- 3)  $x \succ y \wedge y \succ z$  imply  $x \succ z$  (*transitivity*).

## Meaning

- 1) Each pair is compared;
- 2) Preferences are strict;
- 3) Preferences are coherent.

## Definition

A *matching problem* is given by:

- 1) a natural number  $n$  (the common cardinality of two distinct sets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , whose elements are called women and men);
- 2) a set of preferences such that each woman has a preference relation over the set of men and conversely.

## Definition

A *matching* is a *bijection* between the two sets.

$\mathcal{A} = \{\text{Anna, Giulia, Maria}\}$

$\mathcal{B} = \{\text{Bob, Frank, Emanuele}\}$

A **matching**

$[(\text{Anna, Emanuele}), (\text{Giulia, Bob}), (\text{Maria, Frank})]$ .

# Stable matching

## Definition

A man  $m$  and a woman  $W$  object to the matching  $\Lambda$  if  $m$  and  $W$  both prefer each other to the person paired to them in the matching  $\Lambda$ .

For instance:

$$\Lambda = \{(m, W), (b, Z), \dots\}$$

and

$$b \succ_w m \quad \wedge \quad W \succ_b Z.$$

## Definition

A matching  $\Lambda$  is called *stable* provided there is *no* pair woman–man objecting to  $\Lambda$ .

# Example

$$\mathcal{M} = \{a, b, c, d\}, \mathcal{W} = \{A, B, C, D\}.$$

Preferences men:

- $D \succ_a C \succ_a B \succ_a A, \quad B \succ_b A \succ_b C \succ_b D$
- $D \succ_c A \succ_c C \succ_c B, \quad A \succ_d D \succ_d C \succ_d B.$

Preferences women:

- $b \succ_A a \succ_A c \succ_A d, \quad b \succ_B d \succ_B a \succ_B c$
- $b \succ_C d \succ_C c \succ_C a, \quad b \succ_D c \succ_D d \succ_D a.$

Two matchings:

$$\Lambda = \{(a, A), (b, C), (c, B), (d, D)\} \quad \Omega = \{(a, C), (b, B), (c, D), (d, A)\}$$

$\Lambda$  unstable (a,B)

$\Omega$  stable.



# Existence of stable matching

## Theorem

*Every matching problem admits a stable matching*

Constructive proof: algorithm night by night

- 1) **Stage 1a)** Every woman visits, the first night, her most preferred choice. **Stage 1b)** Every man chooses among the women he finds in front of his house (if any). If every woman is matched, the algorithm ends, otherwise go to stage 2
- 2) **Stage 2a)** Every woman dismissed at the previous stage visits her second choice. **Stage 2b)** Every man chooses among the women he finds in front of his house (if any), he dismisses the woman already in the house, if someone at the door is better for him. If every woman is matched, the algorithm ends, otherwise go to stage  $k$
- 3) **Stage  $ka$ )** Every woman dismissed at the previous stage visits her choice after the man dismissing her. **Stage  $kb$ )** Every man chooses among the women he finds in front of his house (if any), he dismisses the woman already in the house, if someone at the door is better for him. If every woman is matched, the algorithm ends, otherwise go to stage  $k$ .

Claim. The algorithm ends and the resulting matching is stable

Easy to see

- 1) The women go down with their preferences along the algorithm;
- 2) The men go up with their preferences along the algorithm;
- 3) If a man is visited at stage  $r$ , then from stage  $r + 1$  on he will never be alone;
- 4) The algorithm generically provides **two** matchings.

**Fact 1** The algorithm ends, and every man is matched to a woman. Actually every woman can at most visit  $n$  men, and this happens to every woman. Thus at most  $n^2$  days are needed. Noticing that the first night all women are involved, the estimate  $n^2 - n + 1$ <sup>1</sup> is clear. Moreover, every man is visited at some stage: all women like better to be paired than to remain alone (Under the assumption of equality of the two groups and completeness of preferences). By second remark above once visited no man remains alone.

**Fact 2** No woman can be part of an objecting pair for the resulting matching.

Consider the woman  $W$ : she cannot be part of an objecting pair with a man she did not visit: she is married to a man preferred to all of them. She cannot be part of an objecting pair with a man  $m$  she already visited either: dismissed in favor of another woman, by transitivity she cannot be preferred to the woman matched to  $m$ .

The matching built by the algorithm is stable. ■

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<sup>1</sup>This estimate is **not** sharp.

# Example revisited

Preferences men:

- $D \succ_a C \succ_a B \succ_a A,$        $B \succ_b A \succ_b C \succ_b D$
- $D \succ_c A \succ_c C \succ_c B,$        $A \succ_d D \succ_d C \succ_d B.$

Preferences women:

- $b \succ_A a \succ_A c \succ_A d,$        $b \succ_B d \succ_B a \succ_B c$
- $b \succ_C d \succ_C c \succ_C a,$        $b \succ_D c \succ_D d \succ_D a.$

Men visiting:

$$\{(a, C), (b, B), (c, D), (d, A)\}.$$

Women visiting

$$\{(a, A), (b, B), (c, D), (d, C)\}.$$

# One more example

Preferences men:

- $A \succ_a B \succ_a C, \quad C \succ_b A \succ_b B, \quad B \succ_c A \succ_c C.$

Preferences women:

- $c \succ_A a \succ_A b, \quad b \succ_B a \succ_B c, \quad a \succ_C b \succ_C c$

Men visiting:

$$\{(a, A), (b, C), (c, B)\}.$$

Women visiting:

$$\{(c, A), (b, B), (a, C)\}.$$

One more?

$$\{(a, B), (b, C), (c, A)\}.$$

# Some numbers

$$|(\text{matching})| = n!$$

$$|(\text{stable matching})| = ?$$

Usually not many!

However there is a method allowing to built many stable matching.

For instance:

$$n = 8 \quad 269, \quad n = 16 \quad 195472 \quad n = 32 \quad 104310534400.$$

# Comparing matching

Let us consider two matching  $\Delta$  and  $\Theta$ .

## Definition

Write  $\Delta \succeq_m \Theta$  if for every man it happens that either he is *associated to the same woman* in the two matchings or he is *associated to a preferred woman* in  $\Delta$ . Write  $\Delta \succeq_w \Theta$  if for every woman it happens that either she is *associated to the same man* in the two matchings or she is *associated to a preferred man* in  $\Delta$ .

Remarks

$\Delta \succeq_m (\succeq_w)\Delta$       *reflexivity*;

$\Delta \succeq_m (\succeq_w)\Theta \wedge \Theta \succeq_m (\succeq_w)\Lambda$  imply  $\Delta \succeq_m (\succeq_w)\Lambda$       *transitivity*;

They are *not* complete ordering.



# Women versus men

## Theorem

Let  $\Delta$  and  $\Theta$  be stable matching. Then  $\Delta \succeq_m \Theta$  if and only if  $\Theta \succeq_w \Delta$ .

Suppose  $\Delta \succeq_m \Theta$ , and  $(a, A) \in \Delta$ ,  $(b, A) \in \Theta$ . Must show

$$b \succ_A a.$$

Suppose in  $(a, F) \in \Theta$ . Since  $\Delta \succeq_m \Theta$

$$A \succ_a F.$$

Moreover

$$\{(a, F), (b, A)\} \subset \Theta$$

and so

$$b \succ_A a.$$

# Ordering stable matching

## Theorem

Let  $\Lambda_m(\Lambda_w)$  be the men (women) visiting matching and let  $\Theta$  be another stable matching. Then

$$\Lambda_m \succeq_m \Theta \succeq_m \Lambda_w \quad \Lambda_w \succeq_w \Theta \succeq_w \Lambda_m.$$

Women visiting is the best for the women.

# The proof

Proving that a woman **cannot** be rejected by a man available to her.  
Induction on the days of visit

First day. Suppose **A** is rejected by **a** in favor of **B** and that there is a stable set  $\Delta$  such that

$$\{(a, A), (b, B)\} \subset \Delta.$$

Then

$$B \succ_a A$$

implying

$$b \succ_B a.$$

Impossible! **B** is visiting **a** the first day!

# The proof continued

Suppose  $A$  was not rejected by an available man the days  $1, \dots, k - 1$ .  
See that  $A$  cannot be refused by an available man the day  $k$ .

Suppose  $A$  is rejected by  $a$  in favor of  $B$  in day  $k$  and that there is a stable set  $\Delta$  such that

$$\{(a, A), (b, B)\} \subset \Delta.$$

Then

$$B \succ_a A$$

implying

$$b \succ_B a.$$

This means  $B$  had visited  $a$  some day before and was rejected, impossible!

See that

$$\Lambda_w \succeq_w \Theta$$

for every stable  $\Theta$ .

Let  $(a, A) \in \Lambda_w$ . Must show that if  $(b, A) \in \Theta$  then

$$a \succ_A b.$$

Suppose the contrary. Then  $A$  visited  $b$  before  $a$  and was rejected. Impossible!

To conclude, use previous theorem and symmetry between men and women.

## Definition

Let  $\Delta, \Theta$  be two matching. Define a new matching  $\Delta \vee_w \Theta$  as the matching where each woman is paired to the preferred man between the two paired to her in  $\Delta$  and  $\Theta$

## Theorem

Let  $\Delta, \Theta$  be two *stable* matching. Then  $\Delta \vee_w \Theta$  is stable.

Mathematically,  $\vee_w$  provides a **lattice** structure to the set of stable matchings.

# An extension

One can consider the case when the number of men and women are different, for instance men are more.

## Definition

A *matching* is a function assigning to every man an element of the set  $\mathcal{W} \cup \{\text{single}\}$  with every woman associated to a man.

Assuming that for men remaining alone is worse than being paired to any woman, then the woman  $A$  and the man  $a$  object to a matching if  $a$  is either single or paired to a woman for him worse than  $A$ , and  $A$  loves more  $a$  than the man paired to her in the matching. A matching is *stable* if there are no objecting pairs.

## Theorem

*The set of the men which are not married remains the same on all stable matchings.*

Is it possible that people lie on their true preferences?

It is intuitive, and true, that in the case of the women visiting, they **do not have incentive to lie**.

But what about men?

Examples show that in some cases for a man **could be convenient** to lie.



- 1) Getting married, but not at any cost;
- 2) Polygamous matching;
- 3) Unisexual matching.

- 1) adaptation of the idea of stable matching, the algorithm works;
- 2) adaptation of the idea of stable matching, the algorithm works;
- 3) a stable matching need not to exist.