The GAME THEORY AND COMPUTATION GROUP has been founded with the aim of melting together two complementary aspects of the interactive decision making.
On one side, the aspect of studying and modeling interactive situations, on the other side the more applied issues of studying computational tools to deal with specific classes of problems.
The group is strongly interested in collaborations with other institutions; currently it has a convention with the laboratory Lamsade of the Université Paris Dauphine and with the Energy department of Politecnico di Milano, to share a co-financed Ph.D. grant. Every scholar/institution interested in having a joint project with us is very welcome.
Permanent Itinerant Game Theory Seminars (P.I.G.S.)
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? Persuasion plays a crucial role in many economic activities, e.g., courts, lobbying, financial disclosure and political campaigns. The general problem that will be discussed is how to persuade a rational agent by controlling her informational environment. We consider a symmetric information setting with an arbitrary state space and action space, an arbitrary prior, and arbitrary state-dependent preferences for both Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an informative signal about the state of the world, Receiver observes a realization from this signal, and then she takes an action. Throughout the analysis, the Sender is prohibited from making transfers or affecting Receiver’s payoffs in any way. We focus on two questions:
(i) When does there exist a signal that strictly benefits Sender?
(ii) What is an optimal signal from Sender’s perspective?
This talk will discuss the work and results presented by Prof. Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago) at the 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory on Mechanism Design.
Speaker: Andrea Celli
When: Tuesday, December 12th, 2017, 11:00 am
Where: Seminar Room of the Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1 (Building U7, second floor, room 2104)